Surface Warfare Officer Human Factors Attitudes Questionnaire

Background:

The revised 22 item Naval Aviator Human Factors (NAHF) questionnaire (also listed in the MIDSS) was adapted for Surface Warfare Officers(SWOs). The questionnaire consisted of four proposed factors:

  • My stress- emphasises the consideration of- and possible compensation for- stressors in oneself.
  •  Stress of others- emphasises the consideration of- and possible compensation for- stressors in other team members
  • Communication- encompasses communication of intent and plans, delegation of tasks and assignment of responsibilities, and the monitoring of team members.
  •  Command responsibility- appropriate leadership and its implications for the delegation of tasks and responsibilities.

As part of the confirmatory factor analysis items 7, 15, 18, and 19, were discarded.

Psychometrics:

Through a confirmatory factor analysis it was possible to establish a four factor model was found for the data. A broadly similar model was also found to fit a sample of data from naval aviators.

Author of Tool:

O’Connor

Key references:

O’Connor, P. (2011). An evaluation of the effectiveness of bridge resource management training.International Journal of Aviation Psychology,21(4),357–374.

Primary use / Purpose:

To evaluate the attitudes of Surface Warfare Officers (Officer in the U.S Navy with responsibility for operating ships) to the human factors that have been identified as causal to mishaps in high risk work environment

HUMAN FACTORS IN THE SURFACE WARFARE OFFICER

Please answer the following items by using the following scale in writing your response beside each item:

 

A

Disagree Strongly

B

Disagree Slightly

C

Neutral

D

Agree Slightly

E

Agree Strongly

  1. Even when fatigued, I perform effectively during critical operations.
  2. I let other members of my watch team know when my workload is becoming (or is about to become) excessive.
  3. When underway, my decision-making is just as effective in emergency situations as in normal operations.
  4. I am more likely to make judgment errors in an emergency.
  5. A debriefing after each watch is an important part of developing and maintaining effective teamwork.
  6. In abnormal situations, I rely on my superiors to tell me what to do.
  7. Truly professional Surface Warfare Officers can leave personal problems behind during underway operations.
  8. I am less effective when I feel stressed or fatigued.
  9. My performance is adversely affected by working with an inexperienced or less capable member of the watch team.
  10. If I perceive a problem during underway operations, I will speak up, regardless of who might be affected.
  11. Pre-briefs for underway operations are important for safety and effective teamwork.
  12. I let members in my chain of command know when my workload is becoming (or is about to become) excessive.
  13. Members of my watch team should monitor each other for signs of stress or fatigue.
  14. Junior officers should not question the Officer of the Deck’s decisions in emergencies.
  15. Personal problems can adversely affect my performance.
  16. Watch members should not question actions of the Commanding Officer, except when they threaten the safety of the ship.
  17. Members of my watch should mention their stress or physical problems before assuming, or during, the watch.
  18. The Officer of the Deck should take physical control and drive the ship in emergency and non-standard situations.
  19. Effective crew coordination requires the watch team to consider the personal work styles of other team members.
  20. Good communications and crew coordination are important as technical proficiency.
  21. The watch team members should alert others to their actual, or potential, work overload.
  22. A true professional does not make mistakes.
  23. The specific and responsibilities of the watch team in an emergency are identified during the pre-brief.
  24. Written procedures are necessary for all underway operations.
  25. The watch team should be aware of, and sensitive to, the personal problems of other team members.
  26. Junior officers should not question the Officer of the Deck’s decisions during normal operations.
  27. Junior officers should not question the Commanding Officer’s decisions in emergencies.
  28. It is better to agree with other crew members than to voice a different opinion.
  29. Commanding Officers who encourage suggestions from ship’s crew are weak leaders.
  30. The Commanding Officer should take physical control and drive the ship in emergency and non-standard situations.
  31. The Officer of the Deck driving the ship should verbalize plans for procedures or maneuvers and should be sure that the information is understood and acknowledged by other crew members.
  32. Watch members should not question actions of the Officer of the Deck, except when they threaten the safety of the ship.
  33. Crew members share responsibility for prioritizing activities in high workload situations.
  34. There are no circumstances (except total incapacitation) where the Conning officer should assume control of the bridge.
  35. Officers of the Deck who encourage suggestions from ship’s crew are weak leaders.
  36. Junior officers should not question the Commanding Officer’s decisions during normal operations.
  37. How frequently in your most recent watch team are junior personnel afraid to express disagreement with more senior personnel (please circle below)?Very frequently
    Frequently
    Sometimes
    Seldom
    Very seldom
  38. Have you attended Bridge Resource Management training (please circle your response)?

Yes                        No

Background Information.

Please circle the appropriate response.

Commissioning SourceSTA-21ECPLDONaval Academy
RankO1-O2O3O4O5           O6
Gender Male Female

Last Ship            Destroyer            Frigate                  Amphibious       Carrier

Last Ship            Operations          Engineering          Combat       Executive

 

How many years have you been a Surface Warfare Officer